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Abstract
Light-weight formal method has been regarded as an important approach to development of component-
based safety critical systems. The paper proposes an approach which can formally specify and verify the
contract of static structure, dynamic behavior and reﬁnement of component systems based on UML 2.0
superstructure. As results, the correctness of static contract can be obtained via type checking of interfaces
and connectors. Dynamic contract can be veriﬁed through determining the cooperativeness of integrated
components, whose contracts are depicted with interface protocol state machines and their semantics models,
namely contract automata. The reﬁnement relation between high level component and its implementation
will be guaranteed through deﬁning the alternating simulation between contract automata of components
at diﬀerent levels.
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1 Introduction
It is an admitted fact that software has become the pivotal element in safety critical
systems, such as avionics and aerospace systems, nuclear power controller, etc.
Generally, these systems have the characteristics of real-time, dynamic, autonomy,
fault-tolerant, and should satisfy some critical properties. Because of the complexity
and demand of high conﬁdence, the development, deployment and running of these
systems are faced with grand challenges.
Component-based software development (CBSD) can eﬀectively deal with the
complexity of software construction, and provides the better manner for describ-
ing architectures which present systematic frameworks of applications in speciﬁc
domains. The paradigm of CBSD has also been recognized in developing safety
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critical systems[1], in which it is convinced that the components with dependable
guarantee will be the basis, and the corresponding methodology for component in-
tegration, analysis and veriﬁcation should be studied. Formal method makes it
possible to calculate whether a certain description of a system is internally consis-
tent,or whether requirements have been satisﬁed in the derivation of a design. For-
mal method has been widely accepted in developing safety critical systems. Under
CBSD, formal method calls for the appropriate techniques of formal speciﬁcation,
integration, analysis and veriﬁcation around safety and reliability properties.
This paper studies the formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of both static and
dynamic contract in developing component-based safety critical systems. Its back-
ground is the development of SAFE-II, the lifesaving system of manned spaceship,
which uses CBSD as the paradigm. It is expected that the resulting formalism will
be suitable for formal analysis and veriﬁcation of SAFE-II, and the other similar
systems as well. After we have investigated the characteristics and development
demands of these systems, several principles will be followed in our study.
(1) For the sake of practicability in component-based design and construction, a
popular opinion is that the light-weight formal method should be considered under
mainstream methodology and modelling language.
(2) To verify essential properties of safety critical systems (e.g. via model checking),
the dynamic or temporal aspects of interfaces should be speciﬁed in the contract.
Moreover, the dynamic contract should support the component composition and
reﬁnement, which are common activities in CBSD.
(3) The architecture pattern should be considered to improve the eﬀectiveness of
formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation. For example, in embedded safety critical
systems, the interface usages of software components are usually periodical and
time-triggered[2].
(4) The formalism should be able to describe the compatibility between component
system and the environment, or distinguish which are legal environments for the
system.
Uniﬁed Modeling Language(UML) provides various viewpoints and diagrams
to depict the characteristics of software systems. Comparing with former versions,
UML 2.0 has distinctly improved the descriptive capability of component models[3].
This paper ﬁrstly formalizes the component model of UML 2.0, which will be used
to model the static structures of safety critical systems. To depict the tempo-
ral constraints of interface usages, the dynamic light-weight formal speciﬁcations
are attached to the components through deﬁning interface protocol state machines
(IPSM) and their semantics models, namely contract automata. The notions of
stateful and stateless are introduced into contracts to distinguish the specialties of
services.
Time-triggered mode has been widely adopted in safety critical community be-
cause it is somewhat predictable, and can reduce the complexity and improve the
reliability and safety[2,4]. SAFE-II also can be regarded as the time-triggered sys-
tem. Therefore, the time-triggered pattern is brought into the component com-
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position (But in current formalization, the real-time properties are not considered
yet). Then the essential static and dynamic consistency rules for component inte-
gration are studied respectively. By the rules, the static contract can be veriﬁed
via type checking of interfaces and connectors, and the dynamic contract can be
veriﬁed by investigating if the integrated components are cooperative. Based on
dynamic contract, the way of how to specify and determine the legal environments
is presented. The reﬁnement relation between high level component and its imple-
mentation is also studied, and the reﬁnement consistency can be checked for both
top-down design and bottom-up construction.
The method has been practically applied in SAFE-II, and it is also applicable for
other safety critical systems, such as aircraft autopilot or train control systems[5].
These formal speciﬁcations and contracts are also the foundation of component-
based system veriﬁcation in our future work, such as model checking, compositional
reasoning, and real-time architecture development.
The next section discusses the related work. The formal speciﬁcation of compo-
nent system structure is given is section 3, and the static consistencies are proposed
in section 4. The dynamic contract and consistency are studied in section 5, and
the reﬁnement relation among components is studied in section 6. The last section
concludes the paper with the future work.
2 Related Work
There has been some work related to applying formal methods for developing soft-
ware architectures and component-based systems. Wright[6] and Darwin[7] are
typical ones of early architecture description languages. Wright deﬁnes the possible
interactions between a set of roles, whose behaviors are speciﬁed in CSP. Dar-
win describes software architecture with π-calculus. In SOFA[8], an application is
viewed as a hierarchy of nested software components which can be deployed over
a network. The behavior of a component in SOFA is approximated by a regular
language which can be expressed by a behavior protocol, whose conformance is
also deﬁned. Archware[9] provides a style-based executable language which is a
framework for formalizing architectures based on components and connectors. It
can be used to describe architectural structure, behavior, qualities and evolution of
systems. [10] presents a method for compositional veriﬁcation of middleware-based
software architecture. It is a framework not related to any speciﬁc speciﬁcation of
component system. In formalization of dynamic contract, interface automata[11]
are similar to our approach. But interface automata don’t consider the structure
of component system as well as concurrency and hierarchy of dynamic contract,
and use the optimistic approach in composition. Without consideration of stateless
interfaces, an interface explicitly only can be used by at most one component in
composition of interface automata.
Some other work is more closely related to speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of
component-based embedded or safety critical systems. [12] applies concurrency con-
troller design pattern in Tactical Separation Assisted Flight Environment(TSAFE),
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and separates behavior veriﬁcation from interface veriﬁcation. Cadena[13] is an
integrated environment for building and modelling systems using CORBA Compo-
nent Model(CCM). The model can be translated into the input language of DSpin
for model checking. [14] also studied the model checking of component composition,
in which the behavior of each component is represented with Moore state model.
SaveCCM[15] is a component model for safety critical real-time systems, and it is
a part of component technology which is intended to provide eﬃcient development,
predictable behavior, and run-time eﬃciency. But SaveCCM has not been formal-
ized. [16] and [17] give two diﬀerent approaches in deﬁning behavioral models of
components and composition. The former one considers the hierarchies, which are
not included in the latter. None of them specify the reﬁnement relation.
All the above work can not fully meet the 4 principles proposed in section 1,
and may not suit UML 2.0 well. Approach presented in this paper attempts to
form a light-weight speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation method for both composition and
reﬁnement of UML 2.0 component model.
3 Component Model Based on UML 2.0
In component model of UML 2.0, provided or required interfaces are oﬀered through
ports, and an interface can contain more than one operations. Components are
integrated through assembly and delegation connectors[3]. For example, the fault-
detecting component in SAFE-II is presented in Fig.1.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Interface) An interface u is deﬁned as the tuple (O, type), in
which O is the operation set {op1, op2, ...}, and type can be provided or required.
For clarity, u! or u? can be used to denote that an interface u is a provided or
required interface.
Let u! = u?, u? = u!. For simpliﬁcation in the following, an operation op of
provided(or required) interface can also be called provided(or required) operation
and written as op!(or op?).
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Component) A component C is a 6-tuple (IP , IR, P,R, fC , G),
in which IP and IR are provided and required interface set respectively. P is the
set of ports. R ⊆ P × (IP ∪ IR) maps the ports to interfaces. fC : ∪u∈IP u.O →
{true, false} is a boolean function. G is the sub-component diagram of C.
An operation op! is stateful if fC(op!) = true, otherwise it is a stateless operation.
fC will be used in dynamic contract. The component is a basic component if G (see
deﬁnition 3.5) is empty, otherwise a composite component. The set IP and IR form
the external view of the component, and G describes the internal view. Assembly
and delegation connectors will be used to construct the component diagram and
map one component’s external view to internal view. Port can be regarded as the
bridge in delegation.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Assembly Connector) An assembly connector is denoted as
(u!, v?), which connects a provided interface to a required interface.
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Fig. 1. Fault-detecting component in SAFE-II
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Delegation Connector)
1) A provided delegation connector (p, u!) delegates the external provided inter-
face linked with port p to provided interface u! of internal view.
2) A required delegation connector (u?, p) delegates the service required by in-
terface u? to external required interface linked with port p.
For example, (AO2!, EI?), (P4, EO!) and (AI1?, P1) in Fig.1 are assembly,
provided delegation and required delegation connectors respectively. A component
diagram describes how the components are connected and form the composite com-
ponent or system.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Component Diagram) A component diagram G is a 3-tuple
(V, F,E). V is the component set. F is a set of at most one component, which is
the parent of components in V . E = (NA, NDp , NDr ). NA is the set of assembly
connectors, and for ∀(u!, v?) ∈ NA, ∃C1, C2 ∈ V , u! ∈ C1.IP , v? ∈ C2.IR. NDp and
NDr are provided and required delegation connector set respectively:
(i) If F = ∅, i.e. G is the sub-component diagram of the only component C = (IP ,
IR, P,R, fC , G) ∈ F :
(a) For ∀(p, u!) ∈ NDp , ∃C1 ∈ V , u! ∈ C1.IP , and p ∈ C.P .
(b) For ∀(u?, p) ∈ NDr , ∃C1 ∈ V , u? ∈ C1.IR, and p ∈ C.P .
(ii) If F = ∅, i.e. G is a topmost component diagram which does not belong to any
component, NDp = ∅ ∧NDr = ∅.
In a component diagram G, components in the same hierarchy are connected
through assembly connectors. Some interfaces of these components can be con-
nected with the ports of the component which regards G as sub-component diagram.
In Fig.1, the elements inside Fault Detection form its sub-component diagram. Ev-
ery component in diagram can has its own sub-component diagram, thus hierarchy
model will be obtained.
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Fig. 2. Consistencies for delegation connectors
4 Static Consistencies
In component integration, the connected interfaces should be compatible to ensure
correct mapping between requests and services. These are static constrains which
can be veriﬁed via type checking. Some static consistencies that assembly and
delegation connectors should satisfy are deﬁned in the following.
Consistency 1 An assembly connector (u!, v?) is consistent if v.O ⊆ u.O.
This rule requires that for an assembly connector, all operations needed in re-
quired interface should be served by the provided interface.
Consistency 2 For a component C = (IP , IR, P,R, fC , G) and a port p ∈ P , if
R(p) ∈ IP and G is not empty, let G = (V, F,E), then for all (p, ui!) ∈ E.NDp ,
R(p).O ⊆ ∪ui.O.
For example, in the left of Fig.2, interfaces Prov2! and Prov3! must implement
all the services that can be provided by Prov1!.
Consistency 3 For a component C = (IP , IR, P,R, fC , G) and a port p ∈ P , if
R(p) ∈ IR and G is not empty, let G = (V, F,E), then for all (ui?, p) ∈ E.NDr ,
∪ui.O ⊆ R(p).O.
For example, in the right of Fig.2, the requirements deﬁned in Req1? must
contain all the required operations of Req2? and Req3?.
5 Dynamic Contract
Safety critical systems have rigorous requirements in temporal order of interface op-
eration usage. Thus, it is necessary to deﬁne the dynamic contracts for components.
But it is not for all interfaces that should have temporal constraints. Some provided
operations can oﬀer services at any time, not only in specialized states. Therefore,
provided operations will be classiﬁed into stateful and stateless operations.
We deﬁne the interface protocol state machine (IPSM), which is composed of
protocol states and protocol transitions, to depict dynamic usage of stateful oper-
ations. Protocol state represents an observable stable situation, and the label of
protocol transition is an operation of provided or required interface.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Interface Protocol State Machine) IPSM is a 7-tuple (S,L,
T,H,K, I, F ), in which S is the state set, set L contains the labels which are inter-
face operations, T ⊆ S×L×S is the transition set. H : S → {AND,OR,BASIC}
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Fig. 3. Interface Protocol State Machine of component Arg Reader
identiﬁes the types of states. K : S → S ∪ {ROOT} returns the parent state of
each state in S, and the parent of topmost states in IPSM is ROOT . I and F are
initial and ﬁnal state set respectively.
The IPSM of a component A is denoted as MA. The AND and OR states of
IPSM are similar to that in UML Statecharts[3] which model the concurrency and
hierarchy structures. But the transitions in IPSM are not event-triggered. Any
protocol transition labelled by a required operation means that if the component
locates in the source state, it will require the service from other components. A
transition labelled by a provided operation means there should exist another com-
ponent requiring the operation. The IPSM of sub-component Arg Reader in Fig.1
is depicted in Fig.3. For clarity in the following discussion, each basic state and
operation is assigned a distinct number or abbreviation(e.g., DS Ready is assigned
1, AI2?.DigitalSignal is abbreviated as op1?).
For an operation op! of component A, fA(op!) = true if it appears in some
transition label of MA, else fA(op!) = false. It is assumed that a stateful operation
can not be used as the stateless operation simultaneously. If a provided operation
can be used by more than one components, it must be stateless. Two complemented
operations may become an internal operation after the component composition.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Conﬁguration) A conﬁguration of IPSM is a set Conf ⊆ S that
satisﬁes: (1) ∃1s ∈ Conf that K(s) = ROOT ; (2) For ∀s ∈ Conf , if H(s) = AND,
for ∀s′ ∈ S that K(s′) = s, s′ ∈ Conf ; (3) For ∀s ∈ Conf , if H(s) = OR,
∃1s
′ ∈ Conf that K(s′) = s.
An IPSM must locate in a conﬁguration at any time. Interleaving semantics is
considered for AND states according to the characteristic of SAFE-II, and the se-
mantics of entering and exiting composite states is the same as in UML Statecharts.
The transition model generated from IPSM MA is named contract automaton, de-
noted as ΘA.
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Contract Automaton) A contract automaton ΘA generated
from an IPSM MA is a 6-tuple (SA, s
I
A, O
P
A , O
R
A , O
N
A , TA):
- SA is the state set (i.e. the conﬁgurations of IPSM MA).
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Fig. 4. Contract automaton ΘAR obtained from the IPSM of Arg Reader
- sIA ∈ SA is the initial state.
- OPA , O
R
A and O
N
A are set of provided, required and internal operations respectively.
Let OA = O
P
A ∪O
R
A ∪O
N
A .
- TA ⊆ SA ×OA × SA is the transition set.
The contract automaton generated from IPSM of component Arg Reader is
presented in Fig.4 (For clarity, only basic states are listed in the conﬁgurations). Let
OPA(v), O
R
A(v) and O
N
A (v) be the set of provided, required and internal operations
labelled in the transitions from v respectively, and OA(v) = O
P
A(v)∪O
R
A(v)∪O
N
A (v).
The behavior of composite component can be obtained through the composition
of the contract automata of sub-components. SAFE-II can be regarded as the
system with time-triggered pattern[2], for example, the component Fault Detection
will periodically execute. In the beginning of each cycle, the contract automaton
of each sub-component will locate in its initial state. During the execution, the
components synchronize through interface invocation. But they should return back
to the initial states at the beginning of next cycle. Therefore, in the semantics of
composition, both of the synchronization of interface interaction and time-triggered
pattern should be included.
Two contract automata ΘA and ΘB are composable if O
P
A∩O
P
B = ∅, which means
that the services provided by two components have no overlap. share(A,B) =
(OPA∩O
R
B)∪(O
P
B∩O
R
A) includes those operations that are required in one component
and provided by the other one.
Deﬁnition 5.4 (Composition) For two composable contract automata ΘA and
ΘB , their composition ΘC = ΘA ⊗ΘB is also a contract automaton:
- SC ⊆ SA × SB
- sIC = (s
I
A, s
I
B)
- OPC = (O
P
A ∪O
P
B) \ {o|o ∈ share(A,B), fA(o!) ∨ fB(o!)}
- ORC = (O
R
A ∪O
R
B) \ share(A,B)
- ONC = O
N
A ∪O
N
B ∪ share(A,B)
- fC = (fA ∪ fB)|(DOM(fA)∪DOM(fB))\share(A,B)
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Fig. 5. IPSM and contract automaton ΘFA of component Fault Adjudicator
- TC = {((v, u), o, (v
′ , u))|(v, o, v′) ∈ TA ∧ o /∈ share(A,B) ∧ u ∈ SB}
∪{((v, u), o, (v, u′))|(u, o, u′) ∈ TB ∧ o /∈ share(A,B) ∧ v ∈ SA}
∪{((v, u), o, (v′ , u′))|(v, o, v′) ∈ TA ∧ (u, o, u
′) ∈ TB
∧(o ∈ share(A,B) ∨ ¬fC(o!))}
- For any path (v0, u0), (v1, u1), ... in ΘC , (vi, ui) is the ﬁrst state that vi = s
I
A and
ui = s
I
B, if vj (uj) is the ﬁrst state after vi (ui) in sequence v0, v1, ... (u0, u1, ...)
that vj = s
I
A (uj = s
I
B), vj (uj) can not be left before the sequence u0, u1, ...
(v0, v1, ...) returns to s
I
B (s
I
A) after ui (vi).
The computing of TC illuminates that the executions of two contract automata
are interleaved if the operations labelled on transitions are not included in share(A,B)
or are stateless, and should synchronize if the transitions labelled with stateful op-
erations in share(A,B) are met. The last item in above deﬁnition requires that
both of the two contract automata of time-triggered periodic components should
return to the initial states before the start of next cycle. The stateless operations
can still be used by other components after the composition of A and B.
Fig.5 gives the IPSM and contract automaton ΘFA of Fault Adjudicator, which
also is the sub-component of Fault Detection and will be integrated with Arg Reader
through the composition of ΘAR and ΘFA. For simpliﬁcation, we only consider two
paths δ1 : a, b, e, h, i, j, k, a, ... in ΘAR and the path δ2 : l, n, o, p, q, l, ... in ΘFA.
From the IPSM models, operation op5 is included in share(AR,FA), because op5?
in Fault Adjudicator will be served by op5! in Arg Reader. In the composition,
the preﬁx before i in δ1 and preﬁx l, n in δ2 can be interleaved. Then the transition
(i, j) in δ1 and (n, o) in δ2 should be synchronized. When the composition automa-
ton reaches to state (j, o), δ1 and δ2 can interleave again. But when either of two
path returns to the initial state, supposing that δ1 enters a, it should wait for the
other path returns to the initial state, in this case δ2 enters l.
The synchronization in initial states comes from the requirement in practical
implementation, and also can reduce the number of transitions, even states, of the
composed system, which is beneﬁcial to formal analysis and veriﬁcation. It can be
proved that the composition is commutative and associative.
Theorem 5.5 If contract automata ΘA, ΘB and ΘC are pairwise composable,
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Fig. 6. Deadlock and pseudo-deadlock states
(ΘA ⊗ΘB)⊗ΘC = ΘA ⊗ (ΘB ⊗ΘC).
For composable contract automata ΘA and ΘB, there may exist some states in
ΘA ⊗ ΘB from which the automaton can not ﬁnd the next step to execute. Some
of these states exist because of the deadlock, and will be put into the set dl(A,B).
The other of these states exist because of the synchronization requirement for initial
states between two automata in time-triggered pattern. It can be regarded as the
pseudo-deadlock, and the states will be put into the set pdl(A,B).
dl(A,B) = {(v, u) ∈ SA × SB|(OA(v) ⊆ share(A,B)) ∧ (OB(u) ⊆ share(A,B))
∧(∀o ∈ OA(v),∀o
′ ∈ OB(u), o = o
′)
∧(∀o? ∈ ORA(v).fB(o!)) ∧ (∀o
′? ∈ ORB(u).fA(o
′!))}
pdl(A,B) = {(v, u) ∈ SA × SB|
((OA(v) ⊆ share(A,B)) ∧ u = s
I
B ∧ (∀o ∈ O
R
A(v).fB(o!)))
∨((OB(u) ⊆ share(A,B)) ∧ v = s
I
A ∧ (∀o ∈ O
R
B(u).fA(o!)))}
For example, in Fig.6 (a), when o1, o2 ∈ share(A,B), o1 = o2, and actually o1
is o1!, or it is o1? but fB(o1!) = true, and o2 is o2!, or it is o2? but fA(o2!) = true,
then the deadlock arises and state (v, u) will be included in dl(A,B). In Fig.6 (b),
when o ∈ share(A,B), and if o is actually o!, or it is o? but fA(o!) = true, then
the state (v, u) will be included in pdl(A,B). The reason is that after ΘA and ΘB
running from the initial states in some cycle, when ΘA again returns to initial state
v, it should wait for the moment that ΘB returns to its initial state. But when
ΘB locates in u, it will wait for the synchronization through operation o. Then a
pseudo-deadlock appears, which is actually a design error for time-triggered pattern.
Deﬁnition 5.6 (Cooperative) Two contract automata ΘA and ΘB are coopera-
tive if:
(1) ΘA and ΘB are composable;
(2) None of states in dl(A,B) is reachable;
(3) For any path (v0, u0), (v1, u1), ... in ΘA ⊗ ΘB, (vi, ui) is the ﬁrst state that
vi = s
I
A and ui = s
I
B, if (vj , uj) is the ﬁrst state that vj = s
I
A and uj = s
I
B
after (vi, ui), then none of states in pdl(A,B) appears in the sequence segment
(vi, ui), ..., (vj−1, uj−1).
When one component is integrated with the others, it is expected that the states
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Fig. 7. One legal environment of ΘFA and their composition
in dl are unreachable at any time, and the states in pdl are unreachable after each
component has left initial state in a cycle.
Consistency 4 A component diagram (V, F,E) is consistent iﬀ the contract au-
tomata of any two components in V are cooperative.
In practice, it is unnecessary to check each pair of components in verifying this
rule. The veriﬁcation can be combined with the process of composition. Because
⊗ is commutative and associative, it can be proved that if the above consistency
is not satisﬁed, then in any composition sequence ΘAn ⊗ (ΘAn−1 ⊗ (... ⊗ (ΘA2 ⊗
ΘA1)...) selected to compute ⊗V (denotes the composition of contract automata of
all components in V ), there will exist some i that (ΘAi ⊗ (ΘAi−1 ...⊗ (ΘA2⊗ΘA1)...)
is not cooperative with ΘAi+1; on the other side, if the consistency is satisﬁed, the
case of uncooperative will not exist in any composition sequence. Therefore, we can
choose any one composition sequence to compute ⊗V , and if an uncooperative case
is faced, the consistency is not met, otherwise it is satisﬁed.
The above consistency can only ensure the correctness among components within
the system, but there still may be some required interfaces should be served by the
components outside the system, i.e. the environment. To make testing, analysis and
veriﬁcation feasible, the way to specify legal environment with which the component
system can work well should be provided.
Deﬁnition 5.7 (Legal Environment) A Legal environment of a contract automa-
ton ΘA is a nonempty contract automaton ΘE such that:
(1) ORA = O
P
E ;
(2) ΘA and ΘE are cooperative.
Fig.7 (a) presents an environment of contract automaton ΘFA, and their com-
position is given in Fig.7 (b), from which it can be concluded that this environment
is legal for ΘFA.
For a close system, none external service will be needed, only the consistency
4 should be satisﬁed. When an open system has been constructed, it should be
considered which are legal environments of the system, and whether the system can
correctly work in some given environment. It is obvious that an open system can
only work well in its legal environments.
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6 Component Reﬁnement
In CBSD, a high level component may be reﬁned into an implementation compo-
nent, or be constructed through integrating more than one sub-components, which
can also be regarded as its implementation. The high level component and its im-
plementation must satisfy not only the static consistencies of delegation, but also
the consistency between their dynamic behaviors, e.g. IPSMs or contract automata.
Hence there should exist a reﬁnement relation between a component and its imple-
mentation.
For two components A and B, if B reﬁnes A, it is said A is the speciﬁcation and
B is the implementation. Reﬁnement is traditionally deﬁned as trace containment
or simulation. However, it is not appropriate in component systems, and reﬁnement
deﬁned through alternating simulation has been proposed[18,11]. In practice, if B
implements A, B must be able to provide at least all the services deﬁned in A.
Otherwise, the other components can not ﬁnd the services they need according
to the speciﬁcation of A. On the other hand, B should not require more services
provided by other components than that required in A, otherwise it perhaps can not
work correctly because there may be no component provides such services according
to the requirement of A. Then it can be concluded that if B reﬁnes A, B can
have more provided interfaces and less required interfaces than A. Moreover, the
temporal of dynamic behaviors of B should be consistent with that of A. In one
word, B must be able to work correctly in the environments in which A can work
well.
If A is implemented by more than one components Bi, B is regarded as the
composition of these Bi, then A and B should also satisfy the above claim. But
for each sub-component, it may has its own interface operations which interact
only with other sub-components in the same level. These operations will become
the internal operations after integration, and will not aﬀect the reﬁnement relation
between B and A. We will study the reﬁnement based on contract automata.
The internal transitions can not be seen by the environment, which leads to
the two states connected by an internal transition can not be distinguished. For
the simulation focuses on provided and required operations here, a state s and the
states reached only by internal transitions from s can be merged.
Deﬁnition 6.1 Given a contract automaton ΘA and a state s ∈ SA, the set
ΓA(s) ⊆ SA is the smallest set such that 1) s ∈ ΓA(s), 2) if v ∈ ΓA(s) and
∃o ∈ ONA .(v, o, u) ∈ TA, then u ∈ ΓA(s).
Each required operation that may execute in the transition from some state in
ΓA(s) should be served by the environment, because any of these transitions may
be issued without forewarning. But the environment can only require the service
that can execute in some transition from each state in ΓA(s), because it can not
distinguish in which state the component is locating. Therefore, some notations will
be presented according these facts. Given a contract automaton ΘA and a state
s ∈ SA,
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EXRA (s) = {o|∃v ∈ ΓA(s).o ∈ O
R
A(v)}
EXPA (s) = {o|∀v ∈ ΓA(s).o ∈ O
P
A(v)}
For any o ∈ EXPA (s) ∪EX
R
A (s), let
DestA(s, o) = {u|∃(v, o, u) ∈ TA. v ∈ ΓA(s)}
Then the alternating simulation between contract automata can be deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 6.2 Given two contract automata ΘA and ΘB, a binary relation ⊆
SA × SB is an alternating simulation if for any two states v ∈ SA and u ∈ SB that
v  u, the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(1) EXPA (v) ⊆ EX
P
B (u), EX
R
B (u) ⊆ EX
R
A (v).
(2) For each operation o ∈ EXPA (v) ∪ EX
R
B (u)and each state u
′ ∈ DestB(u, o),
there is a state v′ ∈ DestA(v, o) such that v
′  u′.
Two contract automata has the reﬁnement relation if the initial state of ﬁrst
component is alternating simulated by the initial state of second one.
Deﬁnition 6.3 The contract automaton ΘB reﬁnes the contract automaton ΘA,
written ΘA  ΘB, if 1) O
P
A ⊆ O
P
B and O
R
B ⊆ O
R
A , 2) there is an alternating
simulation  from ΘB to ΘA, such that s
I
A  s
I
B .
It should be guaranteed that the reﬁnement relation must be kept for composi-
tion ⊗, which will ensure the speciﬁcation can be safely replaced by its implemen-
tation in component integration. The following theorem will ensure the reﬁnement
relation can still be hold after composition. The cooperativeness also is kept after
the reﬁnement.
Theorem 6.4 For the contract automata ΘA, ΘB, ΘA′ and ΘB′ that ΘA  Θ
′
A,
ΘB  Θ
′
B:
(i) If ΘA and ΘB, ΘA′ and ΘB′ are composable respectively, then (ΘA ⊗ ΘB) 
(ΘA′ ⊗ΘB′);
(ii) If ΘA and ΘB are cooperative, then Θ
′
A and Θ
′
B are cooperative too.
Component-based software development can be considered in two directions:
top-down design and bottom-up construction. In both methods, the following re-
ﬁnement consistency should be followed.
Consistency 5 For a component A = (IP , IR, P,R, fA, G) in which G = (V, F,E),
if V = ∅, then ΘA  ⊗V should be satisﬁed.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
The industry community has attempted to take the advantages of CBSD paradigm
in safety critical system development, in which formal method is desired to be ap-
plied. This paper presents our ﬁrst step to bridge the gap between formal method
and the most widely used modeling language UML. The improvement of component
model in UML 2.0 also helps us to realize the purpose. We study the characteristics
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and pattern of component-based safety critical systems like SAFE-II, and propose
the formal speciﬁcation of static structure and dynamic behavior. The consistency
rules for static connection, dynamic composition and component reﬁnement are also
studied, which can be regarded as one way of veriﬁcation. The method and support-
ing tool are being applied in the practical development of SAFE-II. The preliminary
results show that they have good usability, and provide a kind of rigorous way to
develop component-based safety critical systems.
Around these formal speciﬁcations, model checking of component-based safety
critical systems is now being studied, especially combined with compositional rea-
soning to improve the scalability. Timing constraints are unavoidable in these sys-
tems (e.g. SAFE-II), and how to introduce real-time model and related performance
interfaces into speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation will be further studied.
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